Can I negotiate with Russia: as evidenced by the experience of contact with the aggressor since 2022

At the same time, the opposite approaches and evaluations are manifested - from the denial of the very possibility of such negotiations to the expectation of rapid peaceful agreements. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze (at least a thesis) history of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine during the present war. In fact, the experience of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine has existed since 2014, and it has been associated with negotiations on the end of the Donbass war.

These were negotiations in the Norman format (with the participation of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine), as well as negotiations on the conclusion and implementation of the first and second "Minsk Agreements", which also took place with the participation of the OSCE. However, then Russia did not recognize itself as a side of the conflict and tried to act as a formal mediator. And the war was then local and hybrid, not full -scale as it is now.

However, the ambiguous experience of those negotiations (in particular, ceasefire agreements) will also affect future negotiations on the end of the war between Russia and Ukraine. Russia, like then, can affect the negotiation process through military pressure. And in Ukraine they still remember the failure of the Minsk agreements, and they are afraid of "Minsk-3". Direct negotiations to end the war between Russia and Ukraine began a few days after the Russian invasion.

Their active phase (direct negotiations between official representatives of Russia and Ukraine) lasted for about a month-by the end of March 2022, inertia, in online mode, they continued in April 2022, but without much hope for a specific result. At the end of March - early April 2022, both parties were close to signing a peace agreement. The Ukrainian side at Istanbul negotiations presented the concept of a peace agreement, which looked like a rather compromise approach.

The Russian side later stated that both parties had even agreed on something, but there was no factual confirmation of such arrangements then, now. Why was Russia and Ukraine not managed to negotiate in March-April 2022? Mainly because the warring parties sought different goals in these negotiations.

The Kremlin failed to capture Kiev in three days, but Russian troops stood near Kiev, and in Moscow hoped that in the process of negotiations it would be possible to force the Ukrainian leadership to actual surrender and the fulfillment of most of their demands (change of power in Kiev, the so -called "demilitarization" and " Denacification "Ukraine, etc. ).

The Ukrainian army stopped the enemy near Kiev and Kharkov, but lacked weapons and ammunition, and it was not clear whether it would be possible to stand in front of the Russian invasion in the long run. Therefore, the Ukrainian leadership was then ready for a broad compromise, including the refusal to desire to NATO membership in exchange for the termination of Russia and return to the situation that existed until February 24, 2022.

But for the state leadership of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as for most Ukrainians, it was categorically unacceptable to even semi -formal surrender to Russia (that is, peace on the basis of Ukraine's unilateral concessions that restrict its sovereignty). The theoretical chance to compromise was at the end of March 2022 in Istanbul. However, at that time, Russia was not ready for compromise.

The Russian response to Ukrainian proposals appeared (and only in closed mode) only in the second half of April 2022, when the chance of compromise was actually lost. By the way, when Putin and Russian propaganda talk about the "Istanbul peace agreement", they refer to the Russian project (the project) of the "peace treaty" of April 15, 2022, which was not agreed by the Ukrainian side, because the Russians demanded unacceptable Ukraine, including reduction of the Armed Forces several times.

After it became known about tragedies in Bucha and Irpen, the attitude to negotiations with the Russian Federation has changed sharply in the negative side and from the President of Zelensky and most Ukrainians. Emotional and moral shock from these tragedies formed a very critical attitude to the very idea of ​​some compromise with the Russians.

In addition, at that time it became apparent that Ukraine stood before the Russian invasion, and Western partners began to assist Kiev with weapons, material resources and money. In Ukraine, hopes for victory in the war against Russian aggression have begun to show up. Although the official peace talks between Russia and Ukraine were actually ceasing in May 2022, attempts to restore the negotiation process periodically.

And some such attempts have brought a specific result, but not in the peaceful process as such, but in solving certain problematic issues related to the war between the two countries. The stories of relative (sometimes temporary) negotiation success in 2022 were the grain agreement ("Black Sea Grain Initiative") and an agreement on the exchange of prisoners. And it was a testament to the fact that it is possible to negotiate.

The history of the Grain Agreement, which was signed on July 18, 2022 between Russia and Ukraine under Turkey and the UN, is actually ambiguous. Its initial relative success has ended in a year, the release of Russia from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The short and contradictory experience of the grain agreement, however, gives us both positive and negative lessons for future peace talks.

A positive lesson is the prospect of parallel negotiation format by means of intermediaries and parallel signing of arrangements (separately with Russia and separately with Ukraine). It is this format that can allow to overcome psychological and political barriers to the unwillingness of officials of Ukraine and Russia to direct negotiations. The positive is also in confirming the very ability to reach compromise agreements between Russia and Ukraine.

The negative lesson is that Russia has once again confirmed its questionable reputation for an unreliable and conflict partner in negotiations, which can violate any agreement. Another example of the positive experience of indirect negotiations with the help of intermediaries is negotiations on the return of children from the other side of the war. There are very little negotiations, but the very fact of their periodic is confirmed and some positive results.

Perhaps the most successful experience is the negotiations on the exchange of prisoners. The paradox of this negotiating case is that for a long time it is direct negotiations (mediators helped only at the beginning, as well as in certain difficult situations). Although Russia has stopped exchange of prisoners several times, this negotiating channel still operates regularly as a well -established mechanism.

What could have contributed to the success of these negotiations? In my opinion, this is due to the fact that they are purely technical and specific (in this case, the exchange of prisoners and bodies of the killed - how much, when and where). These negotiations have no conflict of political interests (geopolitical, domestic, personal, etc. ) and the complexity of combining various topics and problems.

Negotiations on the exchange of prisoners are engaged in closed mode representatives of the military, special services and Ombudsmen. Special services of different countries have long been exclusive shaking at the same time and fighting with the enemy, and maintaining current technical contacts with it. Although the experience of prisoners' exchange negotiations is successful, it can hardly be transferred directly to political communication to end the war.

The more negotiations there are big politics and issues that cannot be found in a mutual compromise (such as the status of territories occupied by Russia in Ukraine), it will be more difficult to agree. Thus, the experience of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine during the present war allows the following conclusions: the author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position. Responsibility for published data in the "Thought" section is borne by the author.