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Russia is desperate to create an alternative event by a group of states. Analyzi...

China will defeat in the Russian war. What can a new world order end

Russia is desperate to create an alternative event by a group of states. Analyzing this process, political scientist Mark Galeotti in the column for The Times sees his main beneficiary China and mentions problems for Ukraine on Thursday Acting Foreign Minister China Van Ib accused the United States of "Obsession" with restraint of his country and made it clear To establish closer bonds with Moscow.

Earlier this week, the UK Defense Minister Grant Chapsa accused Iran of "inciting" Russia to her aggression against Ukraine, while selling about 400 small range ballistic missiles. The Belarusian dictator Oleksandr Lukashenko, who has been sanctioned, announced plans to establish a strategic partnership with Iran to use his rich experience of bypassing Western embargo.

After a five -year break, Russia again supplies raw oil to Venezuela, and President Putin has remained several days before the first presidential election for more than a decade, and he will not have to fight the stimulus in the form of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. From Beijing to Moscow and Pyongyan to Tehran, there is an unmistakable sense of increasing confidence among authoritarian regimes.

In part, this is due to the mutual exchange of military equipment, political support and many others. However, this also reflects the emergence of a broader political coalition that seeks to undermine or replace the global order in which the event is dominated. Although most of the effort belongs to Russia, China can be the ultimate beneficiary. In the past, there were many ridicule in the event about the cooperation of Russia, Iran and North Korea as a desperate pile of rogue.

One European diplomat called it "a club that has no friends and no prospects. " However, given that these and other exile countries are China, there is a feeling of an eclipse of "monopoly" world order, which is dominated by the United States and Europe. This was facilitated by the use of sanctions as a west lever. They can be effective, but they also encourage their victims to cooperate and give them a feeling that they have nothing to lose.

For example, one Russian parliamentarian in 2022 warned the event: "If you treat us as enemies and outsiders, do not be surprised if we behave as enemies and outsiders. " Mutual assistance bypassing sanctions is one of the factors that underlie this new axis. This is formulated in the language of global equality and decolonization.

Van stated that "the global south is no longer a silent majority, but is the force of reforming international order", and Putin gladly states that Russia has now joined the "global majority. " In the near future, this will directly affect the war in Ukraine. While Europe gave Ukraine only 30 percent of the billion shells promised by March, North Korea has already sold to Russia at least one million, which is enough for a month for intensive operations.

Most of the North Korean ammunition of poor quality: one Russian military correspondent called them "the XIX century engineering in the XX century shells. " However, this helps Moscow maintain pressure on Ukraine, which is not experiencing ammunition.

The shells played a crucial role in winning the strategic city of Avdiivka last month, and although this year there may be no large -scale offensive, especially if Putin decides not to declare another politically risky mobilization, it really means that Russians will be more opportunities for such local offensive. Such cooperation also has long -term safety consequences.

Prano Vaddi, Senior Director of the White House for Arms Control, warned that North Korea, who is able to equip himself on the basis of what he called "an unprecedented level of cooperation in the military sphere" with Russia, is a much greater potential threat. Similarly, the new levers of Iran's influence on Russia, which bought its drones and rockets, seemed to have contributed to his recent confidence and aggression.

Although Moscow initially tried to look impartial, for example, after an October attack by Hamas on Israel, she had to constantly lean in favor of Iranian puppets. She also signed an agreement, according to which, despite her ancient fears, she sells Iran's modern Su-35 fighters and MI-28 shock helicopters. There are clear boundaries of this cooperation and the area of ​​serious tension.

Moscow does not want to destabilize the Korean Peninsula, nor to support Pyongyang programs to create nuclear or biological weapons. Tehran is also outraged by the support of Russia's claims by the United Arab Emirates to three islands, which Iran captured in 1971. The last official national map of China, published last year, includes the entire Ussurii Island, which he agreed to share with Russia in 2004. Therefore, cooperation is transactional.

While the West equips Ukraine for free, Russia had to pay for artillery shells obtained from Pyongyang, and for Tehran Shahed drones with money, technologies and, in the case of hungry North Korea - wheat. However, economic and political cooperation is intertwined. The special economic zone of Rason, where the borders of North Korea, Russia and China meet, are revived as a center of mutual trade. North Korea's infamous isolationists even hope to open up for Russian tourism.

Last month, a group of Russians became the first tourists to enter the country since the beginning of 2020 it introduced large -scale restrictions on the border through Covid. Their four -day trip was held in Pyongyang and at the Masicren ski resort, and although it may not have been successful for tourists ("everything falls apart," one of them complains) is a symbol of North Korea's hopes from Russia's isolation.

The long -term importance of these pragmatic agreements is that they are part of systematic efforts to create a network of institutionalized relationships that bypass existing world order structures and go to them in parallel. Often they are still clearly limited. For example, since 2014, when the US has threatened to disable Russia from the global SWIFT interbank communications system, Moscow has been developing its own version of the SPFS.

The first deputy chairman of the Central Bank of Russia recently announced that 20 countries and 557 banks have been brought together to the SPFS, but SWIFT covers almost all countries of the world and more than 11,000 financial institutions. Even CIPS, the Chinese translation system in Yuan, brings together almost 1500 institutions in more than 100 countries. However, it is dangerous to discount such initiatives from accounts.

The US Treasury Officer, who was working on sanctions, regretted SPFS complicated his work: "I am not saying that he was developed to violate sanctions - in fact it was done to avoid the financial crisis if they were kicked out of Swift, - But it really means that after many years, during which a single global system was formed, we again see its split into "ours" and "strangers". It is a metaphor of wider process, the main long -term beneficiary of which is China.

that he considers a global order set up to support Western dominance. Beijing's grand initiative "One Belt, One Way" proved to be a kind of expensive disappointment, and its scale was reduced. However, this created the basis for a wider campaign, founded not on one enterprise but at one enterprise, but The creation of many competing groups, institutes and initiatives that begin to look like something more than just the sum of its parts.

The Brix economic block reflects a common interest in finding alternative structures. Ethiopia, Iran and UAE joined the initial founders early this year. Fifteen countries, from Algeria to Vietnam, are in the process of admission to members. The block may not be a holistic geopolitical formation (not least given the tension between India and China), but it often openly states its desire to be released on dependence on Western institutions.

This year, Moscow plans to revive the BRIX Cable Project-the creation of an alternative fiber-optic submarine cable communication system that will complicate access to communications. Before the beginning of the war, Moscow was happy to raise China to the West and sell him everything she could, but did not want to be too closely associated with the state growing on its own borders.

However, since then, Putin seems to have decided that he has no alternative to associate his fate with Beijing and with double enthusiasm to "warm up" other dissatisfied states. His appeal to the country in the country last month has largely contributed to the growth of potential members of BRIX compared to the group of Western industrial countries G7. By 2028, he stated, including new members, 37 percent of world GDP, while the share of G7 will fall below 28 percent.

Russia itself may not be one of these growing economies in the long run, but Putin is trying to convince his country that it is on the side of the winners, "no matter what will happen next, in particular even in Ukraine. " Putin also stated that "no strong international order is impossible without strong and sovereign Russia.

" However, even many of his own elite are concerned about the fact that, according to one Moscow analytical center, "we run the risk of sacrificing our long -term sovereignty for the sake of immediate benefit. " The danger for Russia and other rose is that their desire to develop alternative institutional relationships will create a loose new order in which they will increasingly rotate around a single alternative organizational force: China.

However, since Europe has been gaping about how best to respond to a crisis in Ukraine, and the United States is increasingly paralyzed on the eve of the elections, the results of which, apparently, will not be bitter, serious strategic counteraction. Moreover, even the US will bypass Beijing in the hope that he will be able to restrain Pyongyang, giving him even more levers of influence.