New Caucasian War. What can happen to Russia in the event of Kadyrov's death

Combining cruelty and calculation, he turned the tiny territory in the North Caucasus from the most rebellious region of Russia into the seemingly loyal one - and in the process he called himself a leader that could restore order in his country after a desperate decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But if recent reports that Chechen Field Commander Ramzan Kadyrov is deadly, truthful, then the agreement that Putin imposed after the Second Chechen War (1999-2009), a fundamental solution to the problem of dissatisfaction in the region is in danger. The difficult situation of Cadyrov exposes the wider load on Putin's political system and the consequences of decisions he made in the 2000s.

The statements that Russian officials, starting with Putin, are fatally ill, but these statements are often empty. However, the latest reports of Kadyrov are confirmed by various sources, from Ukrainian intelligence to Russian insiders, and suggest that it is not treated and close to death. Cadirov, apparently, was diagnosed with pancreatic necrosis in 2019. From last year, his health has deteriorated seriously, with periods of stay in the hospital in a state of drug coma.

In his rare public speeches, he fuzzy words, and he had a swollen face. Trying to refute rumors, last week he posted a video on which he was seeing how he was training. Some observers have suggested that these are old footage, noting the discrepancies between his appearance on this video and the other, on which he meets with officials.

Chechnya was a roast in Moscow for a long time, and it could only be conquered by the combination of cruel repression and the continuing bribery of the new Chechen elite. Kadyrov himself is sadly known for his personal zoo and many first-class cars, including one of the 20 ever released Lamborghini Reventón worth 1. 4 million pounds. Given the other crises facing him, Putin will try to organize a smooth change in power.

Kadyrov, who changed his father, hoped to build a dynasty, raising his eldest son Ahmat. However, he is only 18 years old - although it did not prevent his father from appointed by the Minister of Sports and Youth Chechnya - and according to the law of Chechnya the head of Chechnya should be at least 30 years old. Instead, the favorite seems to be Major-General Apty Alaudinov, commander of Chechen Harious Akhmat formations in Ukraine.

Moscow views him as a person with whom he can do business, but there are other people closer to Kadyrov, who can assume that they have greater rights. For example, Kadyrov's cousin Adam Delimhanov has been a representative of Chechnya in Duma (Russian Parliament) since 2007 and has his own armed forces. That is why Kadyrov's probable death is of great importance.

The stability in Chechnya was bought after the war as a huge federal subsidy (to bribe the Kadyrov and the rest of the Chechen elite), and at the expense of the balance of terror between competing armed camps, all of which were swore in Cadirov's loyalty, but did not trust each other. If the attempts to put a new leader are split in the Chechen elite, then it is likely that it will grow not just into a political dispute.

According to one Russian political observer, "there are too many people with weapons and anger, so that it can be assumed that the matter will not be bloody. " If they do it, it will put a terrible dilemma in front of Putin, and at the most inappropriate moment. Chechnya's pacification and preventing the spread of instability in the region to the rest of the unstable part of the North Caucasus almost certainly require significant deployment of Russian forces.

Putin may first turn to the militarized National Guard, which is numerous and well armed, but if you judge from past experience, it is not necessary. In this case, Putin will have to choose between two equally difficult options: distracting troops to guarantee the security in Chechnya at the price of weakening in Ukraine or leave his troops in Ukraine - and the risk of losing Chechnya and destabilizing the North Caucasus.

Honestly, many Russians would congratulate Chechnya, but Putin himself, thinking about his political and historical heritage, is unlikely to be able to leave the territory that Russia has gained more than two centuries. Chechnya is unlikely to be called a typical region of the Russian Federation, but many plans are only the first and most dramatic series of emerging problems, created by decisions made by Putin much earlier in the process of building his country.

In the 2000s, he assumed, first of all, that he will always have enough resources to reward obedient local leaders and governors, as well as enough strength to punish violators. Whatever Putin's attempts to create a cult of personality and historical legitimacy, in essence, his system is based on the rental of elite loyalty, which is offered to enrichment through corruption and trend.

However, times are heavy now, so we have to make difficult decisions: some leaders and regions are still full and others are in a meager diet. Previously, either a noticeable loyalty to Putin or the ability to create problems for him were rewarded. In the current environment, only loyalty seems to no longer guarantee money from Moscow. It is becoming increasingly obvious that local leaders should threaten the Kremlin with grave consequences.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobiangin, for example, quietly emphasizes how awkward it would be if the infrastructure in the Putin capital began to decline, while after a recent terrorist attack, the leaders of regions with a large Muslim population warn of the risk that angry locals may resort to jihadism, If the funds are reduced. Kadyrov was ahead of this curve. According to him, Putin's support has always been a implication: without me, the Third Chechen War can threaten me.

Every time an attempt was made to reduce federal subsidies, which make up more than 80 percent of the Chechen budget (and allow Kadyrov and his associates to live a very good life), he threatened to retreat veil. This is a problem that is particularly difficult to cope with the older and more conservative leadership. In his 47 years, Kadyrov was a relative young man in the Russian elite.

Putin's dependence on the people of his own generation and outlook, as well as his unwillingness to see the destructive environment above, especially in the power elites, turn his system into gerontocracy. For example, the influential secretary of the Security Council of Russia Mykola Patrushev - 72 years, as well as Alexander Bortnikov, the FSB director.

Director of the National Guard Viktor Zolotov - 70 years, head of external intelligence Sergey Narishkin - 69 years, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov - 74 years. This has obvious consequences for their energy, outlook and ability to adapt to new realities. It also creates dissatisfaction with the next political generation, which looks forward to its turn up.

First of all, this means that because of the illness, infirmity or threat of the death of associates, 71-year-old Putin will have to make even more difficult elections, and not at the time he will choose. For example, it is well known that Bortnikov is sick, and for a long time. However, Putin makes him stay in his position in many ways because there are differences about his heir Sergei Korolev.

Putin made considerable efforts to protect his system from predicted and managed threats, from the danger of a coup to the consequences of sanctions. However, as Kadyrov's fate shows, his system has fundamental "prose solutions", with which he can make little without dramatic changes in the system itself. But for him there is no sense in implementing them. Instead, everything he can do is just holding on. But the road can be very bumpy.