Russia captures the event: myths and reality of the secret invasion plan

According to the script, Russia in 2024 will cause a devastating defeat to Ukraine and first expand the hybrid, and later open invasion of Europe. In addition, this article and the material outlined in it has been perceived and raised not as one of the negative variants of events analyzed, moreover, within quite unambiguous goals and objectives, but as something really expected by the Bundeswerer in the near future, since Ukraine is allegedly losing the war , and its defeat is inevitable.

First of all, it is worth noting that Bild has a script for conducting exercises and training of the Bundeswehr units. This is a simple practice - to describe a scenario that they should act and increase their skills. For example, within the framework of joint exercises of Belarus and Russia, the 2017, Vayshnius, Weisbaria and Lubenia, which did not exist, were invented in general. But many frightened the most striking, at first glance, the realism of the events described in the Bundeswehr script.

But how much is this "realism" true? To begin with, it should be understood that the current Russian group in the war zone in Ukraine is capable of. Today it is 462 thousand personnel, equipped with just more than 2800 tanks, 6800 BBM, 4600 pieces of artillery and more than 1000 RSSU. At first glance, it is a tremendous potential, but only at the first. In fact, it is a terrible shortage of troops.

According to the staff, 462 thousand OS They should have 6340 tanks, 19 thousand BBM, almost 7 thousand units of barrel artillery and RSSL. Lack of staffing deprives the unit's ability to perform combat missions. And we can see it clearly late. Over the two years of a full -scale war in Ukraine, the Russian army has lost tens of thousands of equipment, and its MIC is now difficult to cope with the compensation of daily, weekly and monthly losses, unable to fully staff units in the war zone.

What new tank divisions can be released if even the command of Russian troops is not able to fully complete the available ones? Another interesting point is the possibilities of the Russians to step. In 2022, when a full -scale invasion of Russia began in Ukraine, Russian troops quantitatively amounted to 180 thousand and captured part of Chernihiv, Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv regions and advanced in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions.

They were then rejected and fled from most territories during 2022, but the fact remains - 180,000 professional and fully staffed units had an initial efficiency much higher than 460,000 current Russian soldiers. More than three months ago, the offensive of Russian troops on the small town of Avdiivka began. Today, the 45,000th grouping of Russian troops is not something to capture, it cannot even surround Avdiivka. Spend three months on a small town.

I would like to remind that in 2022 a group of 40 thousand OS came in Kiev. Or even striking example. At the end of May-early June 2023, two Russian groups of "Popad" and "Center" with a total number of 100,000 launched an offensive at the Limano-Kupyansk axis of 170 km.

For more than half a year of the offensive, they did not break through the defense of the Ukrainian army, and the offensive in the direction of the main goal, Kupyansk, the sixth month rests on the fortress near the small village of Sinkivka. Not even a cities, but a small village. The Bild script in the very gloomy describes such apocalyptic events that can not be done under any conditions, although they have a lot to do with what is happening and happening.

For example, the same mobilization immediately after the election of the President of Russia. Although the specified figure is 200 thousand low, and the mobilization of 2024 will be clearly higher than the "partial mobilization" of 2022, when just over 300,000 Russians were called up. The attempts of the Russian army will continue to continue throughout 2024 and will enter the state of operational pause in the summer, but will be activated in the fall.

However, returning to the question of the effectiveness of such offenses, they will not have a striking difference for the better and, most likely, the opposite. Hybrid threats to the Baltic States and Poland are also quite realistic, but without a clear, open invasion, since in 2025 the Russian army will be even more exhausted than 2023 and 2024.

Ukraine is now running a war on exhaustion of the occupying troops, and this does not allow the Russian MIC in proportion to the troops, not to mention the formation of new, fully completed units. And an open war against NATO for Russia in 2025 would be suicide in general. But this scenario is interesting. I wrote about it on March 17, 2022 in my article "NATO's invasion of Russia is a short term".

According to the scenario, after the capture of Ukraine for the extremely short time, from 72 hours to 3 weeks, the march of Russian troops from Grodno and Lida in the direction of Alithus and Marympol with access through Vilkaviskis to the Kaliningrad region was to be carried out. The Russian command was taken to the operation of laying the land corridor for 48 hours.

Moscow did not believe that NATO would apply a 5th collective security article and start fighting for Lithuania earlier in 48 hours, while Russians will drag time, explaining from the UN stands and all sorts of sites that it is not an invasion, but a need to create a humanitarian Corridor to the Kaliningrad region. But in Ukraine, the Russians have not gone from plan, and instead of 3 days or 3 weeks they were stuck in fierce battles for the second year.