Why didn't work out. Analysis of the Armed Forces in 2023 from Western analysts

The defense forces were able to liberate almost the entire Kharkiv region and liberate Kherson, the only regional center that has been occupied by Russia since the full -scale invasion. Optimism was also shared by Western partners, who were moving more by step in the supply of Ukraine's supplies more than their own weapons for a new offensive. Focus figured out how well -known Western analysts evaluate the Ukrainian offensive campaign, and what problematic moments they identified.

Ukraine's defense forces did not concentrate all efforts in one decisive direction. The attacks began in several directions: in the months of fighting, the Ukrainian military was able to release several settlements and kill a wedge in the robot in the direction of Tokmak, as well as cut off the performance of the invaders in the direction of the Great Novosilka. In addition, after leaving Bakhmut, the Ukrainian military began to occupy the dominant heights around the city.

In general, Ukraine was able to return hundreds of square kilometers under control, and hundreds of thousands in front. The obvious causes of such territorial promotions are the strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which they built from late December to early summer, ubiquitous drones and a number of others. The trio of Western analysts believes that for a better understanding of the plans for 2024 and 2025, it is necessary to analyze the offensive of Ukraine in 2023.

In 2023, the Russian army owned numbers, protected positions and new buildings. There were no situations where Russian brigades held the front line of 2-3 incomplete battalions. The invaders owned brigades with six or more battalions with rotation reserves. The authors point out that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in general have shown themselves in defense than in the offensive. The authors also emphasize the problem of military training in NATO countries.

It was too short, and the commanders of battalions and brigades could often not effectively manage units above their mouth. As a result, all these problems have led to the fact that the defense forces could not weaken the Russian forces. The concentration of armored vehicles was impossible, and small groups of assault infantry were unable to lead to a breakthrough of strong defense. Separately, the article indicates the riskiness of the chosen tactics of the offensive.

According to them, the Bakhmut direction had to cling to the reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but the Russian Federation was able to save them in sufficient quantities. And it turned out that there were more artillery and experienced units in the Bakhmut direction than in Zaporizhzhya, which was the main one. The Australian Major General, retired by Mick Ryan, notes that the Ukrainian army was conducting an offensive campaign at several levels.

Terrestrial campaigns almost stopped by the end of the year. The Armed Forces were able to create a bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper and clean Russian artillery and armored vehicles within 20 km, but the progress was slow. In the south, the fights continued, but did not go further "Surovikin's lines". Ukraine continued the operational shock campaign, trying to undermine the ability of the Russian Federation to maintain its strength in the south and east.

To do this, the winged Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles, Ballistic ATCMS with a cassette combat part and GLMRS rocket. The Australian officer believes that operative strikes have destroyed some material and technical means, headquarters and reserves, but they did not paralyze the Russian Federation and its ability to control the situation. At sea, the Ukrainian forces were successful. The forces of defense continued to deprive the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation of Freedom in maneuvers.

In addition, they strike in the occupied Crimea. The Russian fleet can no longer operate in the western part of the Black Sea. The campaign of blows on the Russian territory began. The goals are the defense-industrial complex and strategic transport. In general, Mick Ryan focused on the course of the offensive campaign and believes that after successes in 2022 the expectations of 2023 could not be inflated.

The rating of the offensive: in general, the military believes that the main challenge for Ukraine in 2024 will be a reassessment of the Winning Strategy and the strengthening of the collective will of the event to support Kiev. In the Foreign Affairs, Jack Wotling's article was why Ukraine failed to cut the land connection of the Russian Federation with the Crimea and to deopen Melitopol. The main reason the analyst is the lack of training.

The Ukrainian parts that took the first blow were a short five -week training. Within the British Interflex Program, thousands of soldiers were trained, but priority was given to the skills that were needed to survive the military. During the Second World War in Britain, it was considered 22 weeks to prepare the soldier for infantry battle 22 weeks. They were taught in parts and at the level of battalions.

According to the author, Ukrainian defenders only took a course in new armored vehicles and were not ready enough. In addition, the Russian Federation built the so -called "Surovikin line" for months: Rila Trenches, changed and equipped positions for reflection of the offensive. It was obvious for the Russian Federation that Ukraine would try to cut off the land connection with the Crimea. Another obstacle was the geography of the Zaporizhzhya region.

Often the territory consists of irrigated fields that are separated by planting. Because of this, additional coordination of parts is required to allow the units to work together and strengthen each other. However, due to open areas, it was necessary to split up to 4 km. There were not critical officers who could coordinate joint actions in such conditions. Wagling concludes that Ukraine should change the approach to the preparation of personnel and coordinate them in cooperation with partners.

In addition, the event for two years of a full -scale war spent stocks, hoping that the fighting would not be delayed for years. In the current environment, Ukraine requires about 2. 4 million ammunition a year to create a local advantage in artillery. In general, many Western analysts emphasize the lack of preparation of Ukrainian military, powerful defense lines of the Russian Federation and the absence of surprise in the direction of the offensive.