Nuclear gopniks. Why the key to the end of the war lies not in the Kremlin, but in Energodar

It is this factor of Western politicians that refer as a turning point in the process of probable "escalation", which they are so often talking about and which, for obvious reasons, seek to avoid at any price. This circumstance explains a lot about the nature and keys of the war she accepted from the beginning. Why the event initially denies the possibility of supplying certain weapons, fearing to "offend" Putin, and then supplies everything that was considered impossible yesterday . . .

Only always later than should be done. The cost of life of Ukrainians. The question is that the very approach of the event against Russia and its assessment of the threat of nuclear escalation are trapped by mythology imposed by a Russian ideological machine. It is based on the concept that the danger of weapons is already weapons. I would call it the "gopnik effect.

" And, we must pay tribute, Putin masterfully mastered this technique, using it very effectively both within the country and in foreign policy. That is why I consider it extremely important to appear in the Western media now, where this issue is taken into focus. One of these materials is Timothy Snyder's yesterday's article in The New York Times, the main ideas of which I cite below.

It also completely agrees with the snider that much greater risks are now not a Russian "nuclear bomb", but part of nuclear threats that may come from the fact of being under the Russian control of the Zaporizhzhya NPP infrastructure. This is what I would now call the main and most dangerous factor in the future counter -offensive and subsequent events. The liberation of the Zaporozhye NPP can dramatically change the course of war. In some sense, the key to its end is not in the Kremlin . . .

and not even in Crimea. He is in Energodar. *** "The fear of Americans before escalation has delayed the supply of weapons that could allow Ukraine to win last year. Currently, those weapons systems that were previously considered escalation, set one by one without any negative consequences. But the delay price can be seen in Ukrainian territories that Still controlled by Russia: death pits, torture chambers and empty houses of stolen children . . .

Tens of thousands of soldiers were killed on both sides. For almost 15 months of war, despite Russian nuclear propaganda and fears of the event, nuclear weapons were not used. This fact deserves an explanation. Those who predicted escalation were mistaken if Ukrainians resist if the event is weapon or if Russia is defeated. Experts in the field of strategy indicate the effect of restraint and indicate that the use of nuclear weapons will not really bring Russia victory.

This would provide a dramatic response of the event But it would make the Russian leaders in the roar. But there is a deeper explanation: all these nuclear conversations of Russia are weapons on their own. It is based on false assumptions. Russian nuclear propaganda proceeds from the fact that the bully-poll always wins. But the bully does not always win. Russian propagandists want us to think that nuclear powers can never lose war, given the logic that they can always deploy nuclear weapons to win.

This is anti -historical fantasy. Nuclear weapons did not bring the French victory in Algeria and did not retain the British Empire. The Soviet Union lost the war in Afghanistan America in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Israel failed to win Lebanon. Nuclear powers lose their regular wars. Some Americans have suggested a nuclear scenario in which Russians will have to use nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. But Russia has been defeated again and again, coming out of its conditions.

What she proved is the ability to change these conditions after each defeat. Russia failed to achieve the obvious purpose of the "special military operation" to overthrow the democratic government of Ukraine. There will be no greater humiliation. The defeat in Kiev had new defeats in Kharkiv and Kherson. Each loss has led to reports of Russian state propagandists and their supporters, to conversations about goodwill gestures, strategic waste and more.

Escalation took place in the work of propagandists. Taking seriously on nuclear blackmail, we have in fact increased the overall unpredictability of nuclear war. If nuclear blackmail allows Russia to win, the consequences will be innumeably horrible. If any country that has nuclear weapons can do whatever it pleases, then the law means nothing, no international order is impossible and the disaster is waiting at every step.

Countries that do not have nuclear weapons will have to create it despite the fact that in the future they will need nuclear restraint. The spread of nuclear weapons would make the nuclear war much more likely in the future. When we understand that nuclear conversations are weapons, we will be able to make the situation less risky. The way forward, to strategic thinking is to get rid of their anxiety and think about Russian.

The Russians talk about nuclear weapons not because they want to use it, but because they believe that a large nuclear arsenal makes them a superpower. Talking about nuclear weapons allow them to feel strong. They see their prerogative in nuclear intimidation and believe that others should automatically seem to be the first mention of their weapons. Ukrainians did not allow this to influence their tactics.

If Russia had used weapons, it would have lost this treasure by the status of a jealous state. Such an act would mean that their army has been defeated is a tremendous loss of face. Even worse, neighbors will build (or build up) their own nuclear arsenals. This would deprive Russia of the state of the superpower in the minds of the Russians themselves. Which, from the point of view of the Russian leadership, is the only inadmissible result of this war.