They took on a leash. Why Russia is no longer a nuclear deal with Iran

To do this, Russian diplomats became intermediaries between his parties, several times prevented the breakdown of Iran's relations with the Iran, and even publicly condemned Iran for violation and delay with the return of the negotiating table. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia ceased to be achieved by any progress in nuclear negotiations, without separating them from a wider geopolitical tension.

Against the background of exacerbation in relations with the West, every time Moscow's more connections with Tehran leave the Kremlin neither the desire nor the ability to publicly criticize Iran or push him to consent to the restoration of a nuclear agreement. Focus has translated the new text of Hannaa Notte, dedicated to the cooperation of Russia and Iran.

Baiden's administration entered the post in January 2021 with the intention of restoring a common comprehensive action plan - about two and a half years after President Donald Trump withdrew from a nuclear agreement. After six rounds of negotiations in Vienna between April and June 2021, Ebrahim Rayy was elected to the post of President of Iran. This caused a break in the negotiations, which ended only two months before Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Throughout this period, Iran reduced the level of compliance with the nuclear agreement, developing a violation after May 2019. In February 2021, he also suspended the implementation of an additional protocol that provided the International Atomic Energy Agency with extended access to information and objects within the country.

Against this background, Russian officials, including a permanent representative of Russia under IAEA and international organizations in Vienna, Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, became the main supporters of the restoration of a nuclear agreement. Ulyanov played an active role in maintaining nuclear negotiations at the proper level, including often interacting with Iranian and American negotiations on a bilateral basis.

In a number of cases, Russian diplomacy has played an important role in preventing the disruption of the Vienna negotiations - according to some estimates, "half a dozen times" only in the second half of 2021. For example, in December 2021, Ulyanov made a mediator in making a decision that regulates the access of agency inspectors to the Iranian centrifug plant in Karajzh, which allowed to restore negotiations in Vienna of the same month.

Three months earlier, Russia also contributed to the imprisonment of a "hot deal" in September to check the agency in Iran. Russia also took care of isolation of Iranian nuclear negotiations from the context of deterioration of relations with the West. During 2021, the contacts between Moscow and the western capitals became increasingly intense. However, American officials continued to evaluate their interaction with Russian colleagues on the Iranian nuclear agreement as a constructive one.

Ulyanov also praised his dialogue with American officials in the context of nuclear negotiations, calling him "intense", "useful" and "business" and characterizing Washington's approach as proof of "unity of goals" with Russia. More, Russia did not avoid criticism of Iran.

In February 2021, as soon as the International Atomic Energy Agency was opened by Iran's Metal Uranium production, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergei Ryabkov, called on Tehran "showing restraint and responsible approach". Two months later, when the Iranian leadership announced the beginning of uranium enrichment to 60 percent purity, Russian experts described this decision as "perhaps the most radical step" made by Tehran lately.

Against the backdrop of tensions between Iran and the IAEA, the agency's access to nuclear facilities in Ulyanov's country carefully advised Iran to ensure the preservation of the videos recorded by the agency's cameras to "avoid problems in the future". In an interview given in July 2021, the ambassador was perhaps the greatest blow to Iranians, characterizing the recent nuclear agreement by Tehran as those who "went too far".

Such statements testified to Russia's concern about Tehran's approaching the nuclear threshold. The Russian criticism of Tehran sometimes acquired a mocking shade - for example, when Ulyanov criticized Iran for delaying the renewal of nuclear negotiations in the fall of 2021. In response to the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran at the end of October that the negotiations will be renewed "quickly", Ulyanov wrote on Twitter: "Soon".

Someone knows what it can mean in a practical plan? " In Tehran, it was forced to make a statement in support of Ulyanov, who called accusations of "dominance" of Russia in the Vienna negotiations "forest nonsense. " The consequences of the invasion were increasingly obvious.

On March 5, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov for the first time stated that Western sanctions imposed against Russia through the war in Ukraine became a stumbling block for nuclear equipment, and warned that Russian national interests should be taken into account. written guarantees that trade, investment and military-technical Russia's connections with Iran will not complicate such sanctions.

The United States, who hastened to answer that "new sanctions on Russia are not related to [a common comprehensive action plan]" were not the only one who was alarmed. Iranian officials also called Russia a "non -constructive" step for Vienna. However, they showed caution and did not openly reproach Moscow, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs simply stated that Iran would not allow any "external factors" to influence his "national interests in Viennese negotiations.

" However, the messenger of Iran returned to Tehran for consultations in the Vienna negotiations. Then Russia gave the European Union an unofficial document that set out its requirements for written guarantees. However, by March 15, when the ministers of foreign affairs of Russia and Iran appeared at a joint press conference in Moscow, any hints of differences or irritation were scattered.

The Minister Lavrov departed from the former Russian demands, specifying that his country "has" acquired written guarantees . . . in the text of the reconstruction agreement itself [a joint comprehensive action plan]. " Despite the mitigation of Russia's position after 10 days of uncertainty, this episode has "cooled" the desire for the final agreement on the conditions of restoration of a nuclear agreement, which was within reach until the beginning of March.

In addition, he created in the western capitals that Moscow no longer separates nuclear negotiations from tense relations with the West. Such perception could well be warmed by Russian officials that Russia would no longer provide "good services to two parties" - that is, Iran and the USA - to reach the final agreement on the agreement.

In the context of reducing confidence in Russia as an impartial intermediary who wants timely restoration of a joint comprehensive action plan, new intermediaries came to the fore. At the beginning of the summer of 2022, negotiations between Iran and the United States through the EU. When they ended without tangible results, Brussels made efforts to mediate an agreement between Iran and the US on the "final" text to restore the agreement.

Russia, meanwhile, has invested less diplomatic capital in a nuclear agreement, compared to the period until February 2022. The disadvantage of Russo-Iranian meetings at a high level was still not, and Russia continued to take an active part in negotiations in Vienna. However, in Russian statements after such meetings, there were no signs of impatience that Moscow reported in the fall of 2021.

For example, on August 25, after Iran asked extra time to submit his reasons for the "final" text, Ulyanov stated that "we should be patient. " When Iran shared his answer, insisting on the previously removed demand for the termination of investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency Agency Agency, Russia's response was again condescending. A year earlier, Russian officials subtly criticized Iran for being drawn to the renewal of negotiations.

Now they have recognized the requirements of Iran, which Washington views as "rollback" in negotiations, "smart". In addition to the manifestation of endless patience to Tehran, Russia is generally refrain from criticism. In June 2022, 30 members of the IAEA Council voted in favor of the resolution (which Russia rejected), which urges Iran to cooperate with the UN inspectors in the investigation of three undeclared objects.

Subsequently, Iran disconnected several cameras installed by the agency at nuclear facilities, which did not cause any protests or even anxiety from Russia. Instead, Russian officials have accused the Council's resolution of undermining "the continuation of the normal interaction of Iran with [the International Atomic Energy Agency] on unresolved issues.

" The obvious desire of Russia to allow Iran to slow down the negotiations in Vienna instead of actively achieving progress, can be explained at least partially by increasing its dependence on the Islamic Republic. Since February, Russia, rejected by the Western capitals, has significantly intensified its interaction with Iran, the culmination of which was the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Tehran in July.

Both countries have repeatedly promised to expand bilateral trade, and Iran promised to introduce the Russian Payment System "Mir" to facilitate commercial transactions. Having met with his Iranian colleague in the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in mid-September, Putin said that in the first five months of 2022, the Russian-Iranian bilateral trade increased by 30%.

Two countries have also announced progress in the implementation of several energy projects in the Iranian intelligence and production sector, as well as the swapes and the production of liquefied natural gas that have long been deadlocked. It should be acknowledged that in the past plans for strengthening economic ties were lagged behind applications, and recent growth of bilateral trade was predominantly due to Russian exports of agricultural products.

The structure of Russian and Iranian economies, especially their competition in the field of hydrocarbons, limits the prospects of growing interdependence. However, given the fact that both countries are in a tense situation, their economic steps should not be discounted. On the Military Front, Moscow recently used Iranian drones for the task of strikes in Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, and the United States suspects it in an attempt to buy Iranian landsckets of the Earth-Earth class.

The expansion of Russia's military-defense cooperation with Iran changes the rules of the game, as it rebuilds the relationship between the feudal lord and the vassal, in which all the levers of influence were previously in Russia. In addition to the war in Ukraine, Iran has long demonstrated its value for Moscow, cooperating in supporting the regime in Syria, following Russian "Red Line" in Central Asia, helping to restrain the Sunnite radical groups and acts as a fight by Turkey.

Moscow also seeks intangible benefits from partnership with Iran. In June, Lavrov stated that Iran shared with Russia the lessons of his experience "Survival in Sanctions". Given the increase in economic interdependence, such rhetoric indicates an increase in political cohesion against the West.

Strengthening its relations with the Islamic Republic for many years and watching the Iranian "hawks", Russia realizes that even in the case of nuclear equipment restoration, the prospect of rapprochement of Tehran and Washington is negligible. Regardless of the agreement, Moscow will be able to safely count on the support of the Islamic Republic in a broader geopolitical confrontation with the West.

Given Russia's dependence on Tehran, it is unlikely that it will continue to push Iran to the agreement or to publicly criticize Tehran. The increase in tensions also reduces Moscow's readiness to invest significant diplomatic capital in cooperation with Western partners in restoring a joint integrated plan of action.

In addition, the calculation of Moscow that the removal of Western sanctions will increase even more and so the warmer position of Iran in relation to Moscow can also play in Russia. The obvious nationness of Russia for the agreement is the only and decisive factor that impedes its restoration.

Given the suppression of Tehran of internal protests and direct assistance of Russia, Baiden administration in mid -October stated that the restoration of the nuclear agreement was "not at the center of its attention". As the Western powers claim that the acquisition of Iranian drones violates the resolution 2231 of the UN Security Council, which approved a common comprehensive action plan, the fate of the agreement is now inextricably linked to the trade in Iran's weapons with Russia.

Even after the intermediate elections in November, these new stimuli reduce the chances of reviving the nuclear agreement. There is also a risk that Russia's attitude to non -proliferation may change. Historically, Moscow has always defended Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy and regularly sought to limit the UN sanctions against Iran. But Russian leaders have never wanted Iran to become a nuclear weapon.

Today, it cannot be excluded that Russia, which has taken a collision with the West, can consider Iran's nuclear hedging as a desirable stimulus that distracts the event. Although the current Russian leadership still prefers that Iran does not have a bomb, it can consider tehran nuclear blackmail faster as a useful factor, especially given that in recent years, Iran is less threatened by the Kremlin itself.

Russia prefers uncertainty about the fate of a common comprehensive action plan of both a successful agreement and its formal collapse. But if the continuation of diplomatic methods after intermediate elections in the United States is impossible, and the Western powers will announce the Dead Dead, Russia will probably try to protect Iran from any consequences.

It will probably protect the Tehran in the UN Security Council, will try to complicate the event's efforts to "abolish" the UN sanctions and provide Iran with modern air defense systems and other weapons. Such steps, undoubtedly, will even steal Moscow not only with the western capitals, but also with the Persian Gulf and the Arab states. But in the face of confrontation with the West, Russia cannot afford to leave Iran for the same.

Anna Notte - Doctor of Science, Senior Researcher at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non -Playing, where she deals with the control of weapons and security with the participation of Russia, the Middle East, their intersection and consequences for US and Europe policy. It has a doctoral degree and degree of Master of International Relations of Oxford University and the degree of bachelor of social and political sciences of Cambridge University.