Stuck in front of Karlovka: that the Russian Federation fails and fails to be in the Pokrovsky direction

The Russians continue to move in the Pokrovsky direction, and more slowly. However, the military analyst Konstantin Mashovets would not have been expected to expect their offensive actions. Over a few extreme days, the command of the troops (UV) of the enemy "Center" continued to make some efforts to achieve the goals set in both directions.

In particular: In addition, the enemy is now trying for the 27th Motorized Rifle Division/IAS of the 2nd General and 114th OMSBR 1st AK to eliminate the still available bridgehead of the Armed Forces on the Wolf River, located on its eastern bank, south of the already captured Novoselivka The first, as well as again advance along the railway from the turn of Sergiyivka - Zhelan in the western direction, towards Novogrodivka (the closest task, probably - to enter the border of Orlovka - Mykolaivka).

In connection with all of the above, it is worth noting a few factors that, apparently, for the last few days have become a rather rigid reality for Russian troops in the Pokrovsky direction. The rate of promotion of the enemy began to fall again (in the lane of the 30th and 15th OMSBR there are a little more achievements, but more slower and slower). Visual confirmation - the enemy has been fighting for the sixth day in the village.

Zhelane in the direction of his "main blow", but as of yesterday he could not take control of it completely. In addition, during the last week, the enemy made at least 4 times massive attempts to break into the village. Grodivka (from the side of Vesele), but never achieved significant success in this case.

Moreover, the fact that in the lane of the 27th IAS and the 90th OTD is still a Ukrainian bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Vovcha River, and the enemy units, apparent The fact that the enemy obviously feels "some problems" with further increasing efforts in this operating direction. Another factor is the obvious "sagging" of the adjacent flank in the "Center" and the Yug "(between the 2nd and 8th name of the enemy).

In this sense, it should be emphasized that further "stretching" (or, better to say, attempts to pull) of his "tentacle" towards Pokrovsk with the simultaneous sagging of his flanks may end with an unpleasant surprise of a "flank character" for the enemy, although quite logical and obvious.

In this sense, the fact that although both armies of the Center (2-A and 41-A) are drawn to active attempts, but the sections and shades of attacking the assault actions of their leading parts and units have become rapidly and units. It is noticeable to narrow on the front (that is, their scope falls, with the maintenance of their intensity).

Now the enemy cannot simultaneously conduct massive offensive battles in two directions (directorates), which diverge - on Vozdvizhenko and in the Zhelan region. Moreover, within the strip of even one army-the 2nd name, which in turn clearly testifies to the emergence and exacerbation of the need for even greater concentration of forces and means (and, accordingly, constant and regular regrouping of parts and units within a certain association and two with 'with' unity).

Constant shrinking from place to place, from the site to the site, and the reforming of more or less capable battalions and assault mouths in order to be able to maintain a more or less high pace and the level of intensity of their attacks \ storms can "get" any operative-tactical grouping troops. Even as powerful as the center.

In their actions, so -called tactical and operational "pauses" (because of the need to constantly regroup the capable units suitable for attacking the assault actions), over time, their duration increases, and the number and list of such units are reduced, while the activation periods are less do not come to naught. And finally, the obvious and important question is - will the Russian command be "removed" from these two destinations to "break the cursory crisis"? As for me, until they dare.

While the Russian command assumes that it is capable of simultaneously - "preobove the cursory crisis" and lead the offensive, for example, towards Pokrovsk, it will do it (or at least pull with it - "until the last"). It is possible that in this context we will see the "gradual narrowing" of the volume and scope of the content of the entire strategic summer-autumn offensive of the Russians.

Initially, the auxiliary and minor directions, such as Wremivsky or Kurakhivsky, will be "fallen", then the offensive cramps of the enemy on more important, such as Kupyansky or Kharkiv, and the latter will stop the offensive masturbation .

Therefore, although the offensive operation of the Armed Forces in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation has significant prospects for the "stretching" of enemy reserves, and even a strategic level (if of course they still remained with him, what I doubt), but the stopping of Russian offensive in the near future, everywhere and everywhere and everywhere I would not expect at once.

It is for such development that the Kursk operating direction should really have a catastrophe for the Russians, at least an operational level, with a clear prospect of growing to strategic. In this case, they will really begin to pull troops from other operating areas, spat on some little -known farms and villages in Donetsk, Lugansk or Kharkiv regions. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.