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For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin has recognized th...

The Kremlin first acknowledged the defeat in Ukraine but tries to justify Putin and push a new wave of hidden mobilization: map and ISW evaluation

For the first time since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin has recognized the defeat of its troops in Ukraine (after the Armed Forces counter-offensive in the Kharkiv region), but Moscow concentrated the efforts to lift any responsibility for this failure from Vladimir Putin. Such conclusions are voiced in its new summary on September 13, the American Institute for Studying War.

Its analysts point out that from the beginning of the invasion of "Moscow was openly recognized" the failure of its troops in Ukraine, and now Kremlin officials and propagandists of the Russian state media "widely discuss the causes of the defeat of Russia in the Kharkiv region". ISW experts call such a new rhetoric a "noticeable change" compared to their former scheme of coverage of events on the front as "exaggerated or fabricated successes of Russia with minimal detail.

" The retreat from the island of Snake was called a gesture of goodwill, and departure from Kyiv and from the northern regions of Ukraine-allegedly a change in the priorities of the Russian army with focus in the Donbas.

Video of the Kremlin's Ruporas now "are working to remove any responsibility for the defeat from Putin, instead imposing the blame for the loss of almost the entire territory captured earlier in the Kharkiv region, on insufficiently informed military advisers in the Putin environment", it states isw.

But even such rhetoric shows that "Putin is ready and capable of admitting, and even to accept Russia's defeat - at least in some cases - and focus on the blame", consider analysts of the Institute of War Study. They pay special attention to calling for mobilization that are increasingly being heard in the Russian Federation - including the words of the CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov at the first autumn meeting of the State Duma on September 13.

("How is a special military operation different from war? Military operation can you stop at any moment. You can't stop war, it ends either victory or defeat. I bring you to think that there is a war and we don't have to lose it right. […] Full mobilization of the country is required, completely different laws are required. ”).

The party leader was joined by the leader of the party - for the truth Sergey Mironov, who called for "mobilization in the heads", as well as the LDPR leader Leonid Slutsky, who stated that Russia would continue the struggle in the geopolitical "collision" with the West.

ISW reminds that all three of these influential deputies have previously been publicly admitted to Putin's "Independence" of Quasreespulic "DNR" and "LNR" before the February invasion and "played an important role in creating information conditions for the invasion itself.

" At yesterday's meeting, the State Duma also discussed the December hearings of the bill, which will simplify the formalities for the drafts of the Russians (in particular, the summons sent by mail will be equated with its delivery personally). Of all this, ISW concludes that the Kremlin is probably trying to use the defeat in the Kharkiv region to promote hidden mobilization.

Zuganov, Mironova and Slutski statements to be aimed at pushing the Russians to participate in the war more actively, and the said bill can further facilitate the current campaign aimed . Moscow's efforts can provoke a fear of general mobilization, encouraging some men to sign contracts for military service with a volunteer participation - at a contrast with the risk of being forcibly and without such compensation.

However, the new bill on simplification of the conscription does not indicate that Putin is preparing to declare general mobilization - "and it is far from clear whether he could do it quickly," writes ISW analysts. In their opinion, such a full -scale call would undermine the opportunities of the Russian Defense Ministry for the training and equipment of new soldiers, since the Russian training base is now "overloaded with the preparation of a limited number of volunteer battalions".

Russia would probably have to "significantly expand its training base - but it is a time -consuming process - and then find and prepare for hostilities enough equipment to complete a large number of new units before it can at least start coping with a large inflow new conscripts.

" At the same time, the widely discussed lack of military equipment in Russia testifies to the serious failures of the military industry of the Russian Federation, through which the production of the necessary equipment, ammunition and other security for the large army of mobilized will be very difficult. In addition, ISW has not yet found any signs that the preparation for such actions is underway.

The fact that Putin is trying to "peace and restore the commitment of a critically -minded community [military] bloggers rather than to censorship" is important. In this environment, they have long complained about the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and above the military command, and now the Kremlin states openly express dissatisfaction with the course of the war and the lack of awareness of the commanders about the events on the ground.

Russian "military"-propagandists advertise Telegram channels who cover the events on the front clock, and urge the Russians to subscribe to them if they "believe" in Putin. And the Kremlin-controlled media now openly call for an intensive rocket campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure transit routes - this idea is widely supported among many military bloggers.

"These new calls are a sharp departure from the former Kremlin line, who argued that the Russian forces allegedly did not strike civilian infrastructure, and the new narrative provides the Kremlin with public support among bloggers. " , - states isw.

Evaluating the further course of the Ukrainian offensive, ISW writes that on September 13, the Ukrainian forces continued to consolidate their positions in the east of Kharkiv region and, it seems, "conduct ground attacks in the north of Donetsk region. " hope to take advantage of recent successes in the Svyatogorsh area (south of the border of Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, 20 km northwest of Slavyansk) to move to the east to Russian positions in Liman.