The next goal of the Russian Federation: where the occupiers prepare the large -scale environment of the Armed Forces
From a formal point of view, it is one operational direction in which the troops (forces) of the 8th All-Military Army (ID) operates from the enemy, from his "South Military District" (YUVO), including the 1st Army Corps (AK), the former The so-called "1st AK of People's DNR", as well as the 68th AK, from the composition of the "East of the Military District" (invented).
Since the enemy is fighting in several distributed operating areas - Siversky, Kramatorsk and Kurakhivsky, which are separated from each other by a strip A little strange "in the system of organization and implementation of combat management of troops in the eastern operating area by the Russian command), he has, unlike other Russian UPS, so," actively maneuver "and" intensively regroup "own troops (forces) on Significant distances, including operational rear - from the Seversky Donets in the village.
Bigorivka (Verkhn. ) To the Sweet area, Taramchuk. Therefore, when we talk about Kurakhiv Operational Direction, it is worth remembering that it is only a southern part of the Yug "Yug", which still has the northern part (Siversky and Kramatorsk directions), where the troops of the 2nd and 3rd AK operate , as well as a separate group of airborne troops (VAT).
By and large, the 68th AK would have to be in the neighboring UV, which consists of the associations and units of the "Emergency Military District". However, according to all, given the direction and meaning of those tasks that perform its forces and means, at least in an operational sense, this army corps acts "in the interests of" in "Yug".
In this operating direction, the 8th name of the enemy operates by the majority of his troops (forces), in particular: I personally have no doubt that the strip of action in "Yug" in the Kurakhiv direction, as well as the strip in the "Center" on Pokrovsky , now it is one of the main directions of the Russian command of its main efforts in the context of its plans (designs) on the entire summer-autumn campaign in 2024.
I wrote about such a course of events in the winter of this year, when I considered and discussed the possible "promising" directions and areas of the projected "great summer offensive" of the Russians at that time. In principle, it shows that the Russian command had this issue quite similar to my thoughts, in particular during the last month: the advanced units of the 1st "named after Girkin" of Slavic separate motorized rifle brigade (OMSBR), with the effective participation of the 9th " them.
Neylovo, continued their attempts to "take Karlovka" in the Selidovsky direction. They crawled on both shores of the Karlovsky reservoir to its eastern outskirts, but they cannot further advance. South, in the area of the village. Nevelsk, an enemy (apparently from the 9th OMSBR), having occupied the "half of the village", significantly behind the main forces, which are fighting in the Karlovka area.
Well, you can understand: a very open terrain is obviously tightly replaced, so it is difficult to advance. But in the area of Krasnogorivka the enemy for two months as a result of harsh melee with variable success, apparently, finally managed to take almost the whole city under control. There were units of the 5th Zakhasttovskaya Separate Rifle Brigade (OMSBR), and were probably reinforced, probably 1-2 by motor-raiments (IAS) from the 114th OMSBR.
The enemy attacked in general from south to north, gradually displacing the Armed Forces units from the city to west and north. At this time, the enemy's advanced units were probably out of the south, within the city, to the Lozov River, so they have to take control of only two large (ie long) city streets - Krupskaya and Sedova, respectively - to the north and west, so that Finally, "report" about the full "librasis" of Krasnogorivka.
Divisions of the 150th MSD and the 110th OMSBR of the enemy operated directly in the Kurakhiv direction (Marinka Directorate-Maximilyanivka).
After the enemy managed to occupy the eastern part of the village of Georgivka, in this direction he carried out a series of so-called "Banzai-attack", with the involvement of more or less significant infantry forces and armored vehicles in dense battle orders to perform the closest task as quickly as possible- To go out on the border Maximilyanivka - sharp.
And in this sense, there were several "critical" moments in this direction for the advanced units of the Armed Forces, as the enemy also concentrated in this direction a significant grouping of artillery. However, the vast majority of these "Banzai-attack" enemy ended in the two-variant pattern: or the nomination of enemy columns was manifested before the borders of his deployment (respectively, it was caused by fire), so he did not banal with them to get to them in a capable state, or enemy.
"Breeded" into a tactical depth, where he came to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, forced to stop and was methodically carried with drones and anti -tank means. Now the enemy even "uncertainly controls" St. George. And in connection with recent events in the area of Krasnogorivka, apparently, the command of the 150th MSD and 110th OMSBD of the enemy will soon consider the extension They will be very busy with the "situation" in the area of the village.
Visa, where they obviously have to direct some of their forces because of the need to support the actions of the neighboring 20th MSD, which is "torn" now to the road Marinka-Kalledar. Yes, now the command "Yug" and in particular the 8th ID "concentrate their attention" on two directorates of Paraskovka-Konstantinovka (almost all of its 20th Motorized Rifle Division/ISD) and south of it-the 39th Separate Motorial Brigade.
Together with the consolidated tactical group of the 18th machine-gun-Artillery Division (Kulad) from the 68th AK, in the general Directorate Sweet-Water. Also, at least 3 "motorized" regiments of TRV and up to 4 "separate rifle battalions of the mobilization reserve" (OSB MR) are involved in these areas.
At any cost, the enemy tries to break into the above road, so that, as far as I understand, to force our advanced units to move away from Vladimirivka and from the area north of Mykilsky, under threat of coverage from the north. At this time, the enhanced advanced units of the 39th OMSBr of the enemy south of Konstantinovka managed to approach the road 00532, but "physically" cut it (ie "confidently" to control some of its shades) they failed.
In addition, all attempts of units of the 20th SMEs of the enemy to break directly from Paraskovka to Konstantinovka along the Suki River Yalas also have not yet been given a "acceptable" result. That is why I emphasized that the actions of the 150th SME of the enemy in the area of Pobeda from the north for the success of the 20th MSD will be of great importance. In addition, it is obvious that the command of the 150th SME of the enemy will face some difficulties here.
After all, in this case, the parts and units of this division will have to step on directions that diverge almost "at an angle of 90 degrees", namely-Georgiyivka-Maximilyanivka (directly on Kurakhov) and at the same time, trying to help the 20th MSD, at the Valent Directorate- Konstantinovka.
I think, after the fighting for Krasnogorivka 150-A MSD (or better to say, that set of its forces and means operating in these directions) will get reinforcement-or 5th OMSBR, or 110th OMSBR to be able to simultaneously at the same time To act exactly - both on Kurakhov and Konstantinovka.
There is no doubt that the command of the 8th name of the enemy as the "foundations" of the entire southern part of the "Yug" is now evaded "a number of tasks of tactical scale, which are directly related to the main (prompt) goal-" elimination of the threat to Volnovakha "(in the sense, the reflection of Ukrainian troops at a more or less acceptable distance from him and the communications leading to him).