War with the Russian Federation and "Chinese problem". Why Ukraine is a key factor for US strategy against China

However, against the background of general enthusiasm, some analysts are still concerned that the war in Europe will distinguish the United States from a more serious threat from China. And in vain. Given the increasing interdependence between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, as well as cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, a decisive victory over Russia is the best chance for the United States in confrontation with China.

Focus translated the article by Luis Simons on the importance of Ukraine to counteract Chinese threat. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently stated that the United States "would like to see Russia as weakened so that it could no longer do things similar to those that she created after invasion of Ukraine. " If the United States managed to achieve this, they would neutralize the threat to the European balance in the near future.

And this, for its part, would redirect the US strategic attention to the threat from China in the Indo-Pacific. Leaving Ukraine for the contrary, on the contrary, can lead to the collapse of the European security order. In the end, such a decision will divert America's much greater strategic attention and, in this way, will be a much more serious obstacle to such a necessary reconciliation in the Indo-Pacific.

A proper understanding of the relationship between the US strategy in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific begins with the recognition of the three most important facts: the existence of strategic compromises between Europe and the Indo-Pacific is quite real. The fact that the United States is done in the same region influences their ability to provide a resource to restrain other places. Yes, excessive priority of one region may open up aggression to another.

In fact, the US National Defense Strategy states that China and Russia have expanded its cooperation, and "each of the states seeks to create global dilemma for the United Forces in the event of a US involvement in a crisis or conflict with another state. " Because of this, some experts warn of the problem of simultaneous wars in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

The importance of Europe and the Indo-Pacific region in comparison with other regions is usually justified by the only two regions that have demographic, industrial, technological and military potential that will allow any dominant state to challenge and eventually threaten the United States. . Therefore, it is important to maintain a favorable balance in Europe and Asia at the same time, having achieved that no state or coalition of states controls any of the regions.

The assumption that the balance of forces in both regions is structurally fragile and requires constant involvement of the United States, has led to constant fears about excessive attention to one region at the expense of another. But to what extent is this assumption fair today? In other words, how fragile regional balances of forces in Europe and East Asia? The relative importance of each region has changed over time, as did their strategic interdependence.

In general, Europe was the center of gravity for Washington during the Cold War. Although the Soviet Union could not compare the US and Europe with economic capacity and faced structural economic problems, for most of the Cold War, it demonstrated a significant rate of economic growth and remained an industrial and technological superpower. Moreover, communism had considerable social appeal throughout Western Europe.

It is very important that the Soviet conventional and nuclear power, as well as the presence in Central Europe, has been an acute and constant threat to the European balance of forces. There was no such threat in Asia. China was economically weak and focused on the inner world, and it was the Soviet Union that was considered a major regional threat to US allies and interests in East Asia. Today the situation looks the opposite.

It would be premature to draw far -reaching conclusions from Russia's hostilities in Ukraine and to write off Moscow's accounts - Russia is still an acute threat to Europe and the US, given its great nuclear arsenal and modernization efforts. However, Moscow's inability to consolidate its initial successes in the east and south of Ukraine and the high rates of loss of technology cast doubt on its ability to pose a conventional military threat to NATO.

These problems are exacerbated by Russia's economic and political isolation in Europe. It is important to note that NATO has a significant geostrategic depth, since the expansion of the Alliance has led to an increase in its defensive perimeter through the northern European plains and far into the Baltic and Black Sea. Finland and Sweden will now add even greater depth and potential. In addition to Russia, there are no serious challenges to the European balance of forces.

If you leave the question of whether a large European strategic autonomy or sovereignty can be profitable to the United States, Europe still faces multidirectional national interests, and its autonomy is mostly limited to economic issues. The war in Ukraine has only increased Europe's dependence on the United States in the field of security and energy.

Despite the fact that Europe is still forced to deal with a number of economic problems and problems in the field of security, no one has doubts about the fundamental European balance of forces. This cannot be said about the Indo-Pacific region, where every time the larger China is a formidable multi-level force.

His military modernization and perseverance improved China's regional military position on the United States, calling into question the freedom of movement of America at the Western Pacific Fighting Theater. The fact that the territory of China covers most of the western Pacific coast, and the perimeter of defense under the leadership of the United States in East Asia has a limited geostrategic depth, gives Beijing the opportunity to project its power in the open sea.

Moreover, many countries in East Asia are in the economic orbit of China and maintain good political relations with Beijing. The United States actually recognizes more inequality between Russia and China every time. Deputy Defense Minister Kathleen GIKS recently mentioned Russia as a "acute threat", which means "it can be acute, short -term and potentially fleeting. " China, on the contrary, is perceived as a "long -term challenge" that can "apply a comprehensive set of tools.

" This difference cannot be neglected. Moscow is still a nuclear threat and can keep US allies in Eastern Europe. But it cannot violate the European balance of power, not to mention global. But China is capable of it. In short, the United States faces the problem of balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific region and the problem of stability in Europe. It puts the Indo-quiet ocean on a higher strategic level.

Perhaps the degree of interdependence between Europe and the Indo-Pacific region is even higher today than during the Cold War. If the United States had to fit more into Europe in response to the expected increase in the Soviet threat, the risks that occur in other regions would be less acute. In the end, the Soviet resources were also limited, and the advantage of the USSR in favor of Europe automatically shake Moscow's strategic capabilities in East Asia.

Therefore, the feeling of a geostrategic compromise between both regions and US allies was not as sharp as today. China's rise means that the current challenge is more reminiscent of World War II, when the United States and their allies were faced with the simultaneous challenges of different rivals at different theaters. Fortunately, today the European balance is not a threat.

However, the prospect of endemic instability in Eastern Europe, which is at risk for US allies under the treaty, nuclear status of Russia, and Washington's existing obligations indicate that the involvement of the United States in Europe may be higher than requires a balance of power balance. Yes, this region will remain for Washington more important than any other than Indo-Pacific. However, this importance is likely to decrease.

At this stage, it would be a mistake to completely switch to China, expecting that European countries will be able to maintain restraining and security on a continent with a limited US participation. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that the US political and military leadership remains the center of gravity for any effort to support the European Security Architecture. Speaking directly, it is difficult to explain Russia's failures in Ukraine without the support of Kiev by the United States.

Too hasty, leading to the collapse of the European Security Architecture, will eventually require much more strategic resources and attention in the future. Any viable strategy for deterrent to Russia will require constant participation of the United States in Europe, especially if we assume that Russia will eventually re-arry and restore.

However, the victory of Ukraine will be focused on factors such as command and control, firearms and key means that will complement such a necessary increase in Europe's own defense potential and strengthen Europe's role in NATO. This will allow the United States to transfer the forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific in the event of a crisis in Taiwan or other places.

Despite the statement of other analysts, the decisive counteraction to the Russian threat and a significant weakening of Russian power is the best way to ensure a stable reconciliation in favor of the US in the Indo-Pacific. It is not only in favor of Europe or America-US Allies in the Indo-Pacific region is also strategically interested in Washington's success in Europe.