The decision that opened the door to occupation: Crimea and the lesson of 1994

Focus found out how the compromise of 1994 became a strategic mistake, gave the Kremlin a springboard for annexation and still determines the course of the war today. On this day, November 17, 1994, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine took a step that seemed technical at the time — canceled the "Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of Crimea.

" In the political storm of the first years of independence, this decision seemed like a compromise that was supposed to "pacify" Simferopol and return the Crimean authorities to the legal field of Ukraine. But in retrospect, it is clear: it was the half-measures at that time, the fear of calling a spade a spade, and attempts to appease pro-Russian forces in autonomy that became the foundation for the 2014 annexation and the current threat to the entire south of the country.

The beginning of the 1990s was a time when Ukraine was just forming the institutions of statehood. Crimea was the most vulnerable link in this structure: pro-Russian parties, the "Russian Unity" and "Respublika" movements dominated local politics even then, and the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, which was never completely divided, became a lever of Kremlin pressure.

In 1992, the Crimean parliament adopted its own Constitution with practically state independence: president, citizenship, foreign policy. Kyiv called these actions a violation of sovereignty, but instead of a harsh response, it followed the path of agreements — autonomy was left, and contradictory norms were promised to be "clarified. " In May 1992, Crimean deputies proclaimed the "state sovereignty of the Republic of Crimea". It was an actual attempt to create a quasi-state within Ukraine.

After long negotiations and political bargaining, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 1994 got a chance to put an end to it. On this day, the Ukrainian parliament canceled the "Declaration on the sovereignty of Crimea". Kyiv argued: no region can have its own "statehood", as this contradicts the Constitution and the Law "On State Organization". This decision formally returned Crimea to the limits of Ukrainian legislation. But it did not solve the problem - it only postponed it in time.

Kyiv retained its autonomy, did not affect the loyalty of local elites to Moscow, and left Russian influence on the peninsula practically unchanged. Why it was important and why it turned out not to be enough The annexation of 2014 was not a lightning operation - it was the finale of a process that began when Kyiv allowed Crimea to have its own institutions, which easily turned into pro-Russian ones. The annulled declaration did not stop regional separatism.

On the contrary, it created the illusion that the problem is "quiet". It was this false illusion that Putin relied on when he ordered the "special operation" in February 2014. Military and political expert Dmytro Snegiriov explains that the current situation around Crimea is not only about the military sphere. For the Kremlin, the peninsula is an ideological support, a tool of foreign policy and an element of information dictatorship.

Putin is trying to go down in history as a "land collector" and create the image of a leader who "returned Crimea. " That is why economic arguments are no longer important for him: the key is symbolism and control. Snegiriov emphasizes: for the Russian Federation, Crimea is first of all a military base on the Black Sea.

The naval component of the Russian presence has significantly weakened - many ships of the Black Sea Fleet have been destroyed, and the level of control of the Russian Federation in the sea has fallen to a historic low. The assessment of British intelligence confirms that the fleet has almost lost its combat capability and strategic importance. However, there remains a land component — an extensive infrastructure, Soviet military airfields and military towns.

It is they who give Russia the opportunity to support groups of troops in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. For the Russian Federation, Crimea is also an instrument of permanent political presence and control over the Black Sea region. Although the Black Sea is formally controlled by Turkey through the straits, de facto control over Crimea allows Moscow to influence the security environment of Ukraine, Turkey and Romania.

According to the expert, the economic logic of the Kremlin regarding Crimea is weak. The scale of cargo transportation does not correspond to the ambitions of the Russian Federation, but the peninsula provides it with port infrastructure and the possibility of locating shipbuilding and military-industrial enterprises. Crimea is also important for Turkey, which traditionally considers the Black Sea region to be a zone of its influence.

Ankara pursues a policy of "soft power" and sees Crimea as an element of its own historical and geopolitical presence. According to the expert, Ankara supported a number of projects related to the Crimean Tatars, which caused a nervous reaction from the Kremlin. For Ukraine, Crimea was a factor of geopolitical weight before the occupation. Port infrastructure, shipbuilding enterprises and strategic facilities allowed Kyiv to be one of the key players in the Black Sea region.

Today, the loss of Crimea means the loss of control over a part of the sea water area and the restriction of access to strategic sea communications. Russia, in turn, after the occupation of Crimea, received a military platform for an offensive in the south of Ukraine. It was from this bridgehead in 2022 that the occupiers were able to capture the Kakhovskaya HPP and reach the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Dmytro Snegiryov emphasizes: from a military point of view, it is easier to liberate Crimea than Donbas.

The geography of the peninsula creates narrow "necks" — Perekop and Chongar — through which control can be lost quickly, especially if the Crimean bridge is destroyed or blocked. "It is enough to cut off Crimea from logistics and it becomes an island. The Russians will have colossal problems with electricity, water and supplies. This is not Donbas, where urban development and complex battles in agglomerations continue," the expert tells Focus.

Snegiryov devotes a separate section to rumors that the USA is allegedly insisting on revising the wording regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine. He considers it an information probe of moods — a kind of test of the reaction of Ukrainian society. According to him, the source of such publications is exclusively the Ukrainian segment of social networks, and the reaction of the United States to the "downpours" in the media shows that this is more of a trial run than a real policy.

"Compromises on Crimea are impossible. The issue of deoccupation of the peninsula is not discussed. This is a red line not only for Ukraine, but also for our partners," the expert emphasizes. However, Snegiryov admits: against the background of a protracted war, various proposals regarding the Zaporizhia or Kherson regions are possible, but the topic of Crimea is inviolable. The expert separately emphasizes that there is no point in relying on the Russian opposition.

Even imaginary oppositionists like Navalny or his supporters do not recognize the Ukrainian status of Crimea, but talk about "negotiations" after Putin's death. According to Snegiriev, such rhetoric reproduces the same imperial matrix as the Kremlin. Snegiriev is convinced that only the military path remains realistic. Examples from history — from Wrangel's White Guard retreat to World War II battles — show that Crimea has always been the key to controlling the south.