There is no reserve: why the Russian Federation cannot arrange systemic massacles "Shahmed"

But even if you consider these 90 ShahED-131/136 (267), the January rates of plaque below 2/3 of December 2023-339 drones. In turn, the December itself became a record for raids, but this was facilitated by the preparation and accumulation of drones-Kamikadze Russians. Before that, September and May were recorded, with rather restrained other autumn (October - 285, November - 369) and all summer (June - 201, July - 250, August - 187) months.

From January to April 2023 and quite a plaque ShahED-131/136 per month was less than 100 units. This once again confirms the conclusions that Russia does not have a single, proportional ammunition to systematize plaque and output a stable schedule. In other words, Russia continues to maintain a sharp dependence on the supply from Iran and its production capabilities, which, although increased in the last one and a half years, but not so much as to allow stable mass blooms to Ukraine.

In turn, this does not mean that Iran is not able to increase production - it is much larger than in Russia itself. Therefore, it is possible that during 2024 Iran will be able to reach production rates from 600 to 800 Shahd-131/136 per month. Although each production has a ceiling, and Iran's ceiling has smuggling deliveries. Smuggling helps to bypass sanctions, but it does not replace the potential of free imports.

Therefore, even in Iran, the possibility of increasing the production of ShahED-131/136 is not limitless. In fact, this will not only retain Russia's dependence on Iran in the future, but will not allow mass strokes into the system category, maintaining the need to accumulate Shahd-131/136 and preliminary preparation of mass raids as basic during the planning of such acts of terror. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.