Clouds over the Aegean Sea. Why Erdogan can start war with Greece

" It has been a few weeks since Turkish President Recep TaiP Erdogan has directly threatened with invasion of Greece, using the same statements as before Turkey's previous military operations in Syria. Athens and Ankar shares many conflicts, but now Erdogan has collapsed his anger on the militarization of Greece his islands in the Aegean Sea.

Although the Greek military presence there remains unchanged for the last few decades, Ankara insists that it violates the treaties of 1923 and 1947, which established the sovereignty of Greece over the islands. Focus has translated the analytical article by Ryan Jingeras about why a military conflict between Turkey and Greece is possible. As I wrote in June, the conflict between Greece and Turkey seems not only possible but also probable.

Recent statements of Turkish officials and developments in recent months have only increased risk. If there is a conflict between Turkey and Greece, serious consequences are expected for both states. However, Erdogan's rhetoric, as well as his interests and ideology, indicate that Ankara may be ready to take the risk. At the beginning of the summer, there were signs that the intensity in the relationship between Greece and Turkey weakens.

With the conclusion of an agreement that allows Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO entry, Erdogan was more interested in the opportunity to strike a new blow to Kurdish militias in Syria - however, he postponed this idea under pressure from Russia and the United States. The fears about the restoration of hostilities between Greece and Turkey were again updated in early August after the new Turkish drilling vessel, which allegedly heads to the controversial waters of the Mediterranean Sea.

But despite the great hype in the Turkish nationalist press, swimming took place in waters that are safely located within the direct coastline of Turkey. Summer comfort ended in the last week of August after Turkish media reported several incidents between the Turkish and Greek military. The first clash, according to the Turkish Ministry of Defense, occurred when the Greek military aircraft were pursued by Turkish aircraft that participated in the NATO mission over the Mediterranean.

A few days later, Turkish officials stated that the Greek anti-aircraft system S-300 had fallen Turkish aircraft F-16 in the area of ​​Crete Island. The anonymous Greek refutations of these collisions could not restrain the indignation of Ankara. Since both incidents occurred during a ceremony devoted to the end of the Turkish Independence War, Erdogan condemned the deployment of Greece by the Russian C-300 as evidence of NATO's malaise and treachery.

It was in this context that Turkish President threatened without warning to come to Greece. Erdogan's words caused a sharp criticism. Greek Prime Minister Kiriakos Michotakis called his speech deliberately aggressive, and was suspected by the Turkish leader himself of "unhealthy commitment to my country.

" The US State Department subsequently confirmed Washington's desire that "all parties avoid rhetoric and do not resort to actions that can further exacerbate tensions," stating that the sovereignty of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea is "no doubt. " Some observers in Turkey and beyond suggested that the main incentive for Erdogan was the fall of its indicators in the elections. Before the possible re -election of 2023, he tries to "break the situation", referring to nationalist voters.

Since Erdogan's speech in early September, Turkish media has not stopped publishing comments on the Aegean Sea with the assistance of the Ministry of Communications. Commentators and analysts consistently voice the version that Greece illegally militarized its islands near the Anatolian coast. This statement is based on the provisions of two separate treaties concerning the sovereignty of Greece over their islands.

According to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, five major islands in the Northern Aegean Sea should not be built "any naval bases or fortifications. " However, the terms of the treaty allow Greece to keep the "normal contingent" of regular troops. Conversely, in the Paris Treaty of 1947 it is clearly stated that the Greek Dodkanese islands in the south "remain demilitarized. " Greece, however, claims that these conditions were the promise of Italy, which gave way to Athens after the Second World War.

Since Italy seized the islands in the Ottoman Empire in 1913, Turkey was expelled from the talks in 1947, which made a promise for a controversial for Ankara. Today it is difficult to find Turkish analysts who are ready to fully understand the contradictory nature of these agreements. In Turkish media, the words that Aegean territories of Greece are "islands under demilitarized status.

The zoomy use of this expression is accompanied by a rapid flow of reports on the placement of troops and equipment on the islands. Many Internet resources have posted articles with pictures of allegedly illegal bases and airfields from all over the Greek Aegean. Commentators repeatedly refer to the placement of tens of thousands of Greek soldiers on the islands. However, these figures are based on the results of studies conducted more than 30 years ago.

Recently, the official Turkish radio and television published photos from the drone, which shows that Greek ships unload dozens of armored vehicles on the Greek islands of Lesbos and Samos. Commentators in Turkey immediately took these pictures as evidence of Greece's desire to "militarize" the Aegean Sea. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stated that the rejection of the demilitarization of the islands could formally call into question their sovereignty.

Erdogan himself made it clear that Greece's actions in the Aegean is not the only source of tension. Following the signing in 2019, the agreement on mutual defense cooperation between Washington and Athens, he blamed the support of Greece by the United States, rejecting the claim that the efforts of Americans in the region were aimed at supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. Its supporters in the Turkish media regularly confirm these doubts.

It is often argued that Washington's real goal is to seize Turkey. The removal of the US embargo on the supply of weapons to the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the support of the USA's activities of Kurdish militants in Syria are given as evidence of this conspiracy. It seems increasingly likely that Erdogan has believed in the misunderstanding of Americans. Washington's supply to Greece, he said to the UN, is a "hidden occupation.

" In addition, he warned Athens that American and European support would not save you. There are many reasons to doubt the seriousness of Erdogan threats. According to one of the polls, a small majority of Turkish voters are convinced that his words are simply an election strategy designed to "form an agenda" before voting next year. An even larger share, 64%, according to the survey, does not believe that there is a "enmity between the Turkish and Greek peoples.

" Few people doubt that the conflict between Greece and Turkey will have a devastating impact on the fragile economy of both states. Revenues from tourism, especially resort cities on the Aegean coast, make up about 15% of the gross domestic product of Turkey (and about 18% of GDP Greece). The trade of both states depends largely on maritime navigation. Prior to the appearance of the Covid-19, 87% of Turkish turnover was carried out through seaports.

In addition to potential economic losses, the international consequences of the conflict will be equally serious. The United States and the European Union have declared their intolerance to any attacks on sovereign Greek territory. In addition, neither Brussels nor Washington is delighted with Turkish statements about Greece's aggressiveness. However, in Greece, few people are ready to give up Erdogan's words lightly.

In recent weeks, both print and television publications, Turkey's discussion has been increasingly focused on war opportunities. Since Greece expects his own elections in 2023, Michotakis stated that any direct threat to Greece's sovereignty is a "red trait" for the country.

Critically evaluating the government's decision to sign a defense agreement with the United States, opposition leader Alexis Tsipras tries to find a balance between the desire to shift Michotakis and his own obligation to defend the country in the event of a conflict. There are other less noticeable signs that Athens are preparing for worse. In July, it was reported that the Greek military began to deploy an umbrella to protect against drones in the Aegean Sea, using Israeli technologies.

Recently, Greek and French warships conducted joint training in the Aegean within a wider pact on mutual defense, signed in 2021. The risks of conflict do not restrain Erdogan and his opponents in the election. Kemal Kilicldaroglu, the head of the greatest opposition party of Turkey, condemned Erdogan's promise "to come one night suddenly.

" According to him, the real leader would repeat the invasion of Turkey into Cyprus in 1974 and simply capture the "occupied" islands of Greece without threats and warnings. The nationalist party representative supported these sentiment. He believes that Erdogan has demonstrated his inability to manage without forcing Greece to "pay the price" for sending armored vehicles to Samos and Lesbos.

The war between Greece and Turkey seems unlikely to him, but he is convinced that any conflict will lead to the loss of Greece of his islands. Erdogan's ally, the leader of the nationalists Devlet Bakhcheli, was demonstrated by the most radical mood. In July, he gladly posed with a map, where most of the Greek islands of the Aegean, including mole, were depicted as a Turkish territory.

Most recently, Bakhcheli stated in the Great National Turkey's National Assembly that "sovereignty, property rights, maritime jurisdiction and air space" of several Greek islands "are undoubtedly and legally" belonging to Turkey.

Although this does not necessarily indicate the inevitable conflict, such a general coincidence of Greece's thoughts makes the obvious question: what does Ankar hope to achieve further escalation? In the absence of clear demands on the part of Erdogan, few people in Turkish media dare to build large assumptions. Several former senior officers offered to block the Greek islands or attack them in the hope of depriving them of their military bases and weapons.

A much more comprehensive and thinner course of action is described in the works of Hasan Basri Yalchyna, a frequent news commentator and a former research leader at the largest Turkey Analytical Center - the Fund for Political, Economic and Social Studies (Seta). In his view, Erdogan's threat to "come without warning" was the beginning of a long -term operation aimed at capturing the Aegean Islands.

From a legal point of view, he states, Ankara should blame Greece of violation of Lozan and Paris treaties, thereby depriving Athens of sovereignty over his territories. "Cyprus is the best example of such a strategy," Yalchin concludes. The invasion and occupation of the island territory of Greece, like the attack of Turkey on Cyprus in 1974, would help to "View the Status of Islands".

Perhaps, according to one of the commentators, the personal annoyance of Erdogan due to the increased strength and role of Greece in the international arena will push him to escalation. The desire to gain voters or even a constitutional opportunity to postpone the vote before the threat of war can also play a role. In addition, it seems that Turkey has a common confidence in the positive result of any confrontation with Greece.

The political climate in Turkey is strongly reminiscent of the political climate in the United States before invading Iraq in 2003. Many Americans regarded Iraq as a threat to the safety of the Middle East. Similarly, in Turkey, there is discontent and impatience when it comes to Greek problems. As in the case of Washington's approach to Saddam Hussein in 2002, an optimistic premonition prevails in Ankar that any conflict with Greece will be short, decisive and victorious.

In the end, Turkey has repeatedly humiliated Greece on the battlefield. Turkish commentators generally share Erdogan's confidence that the country's intervention in Syria, Nagorno -Karabakh, Iraq and Libya demonstrated Turkish military advantage, such as Kosovo, Bosnia and the Persian Gulf war. Outstanding Turkish commentators describe their Greek antagonists as initially weak and vicious, reminiscent of fanatical American news that covered the 2003 war.

In short, if Erdogan chooses a war, because he, like many others, considers her success predetermined. Of course, Turkey's attack on Greece will cause potentially irreparable damage to Ankara, the European Union and NATO, especially given the defensive pact of Greece with France and the active presence of American staff in the Aegean Sea.

Against the background of invasion of Ukraine, any attempt to occupy the Greek territory will undoubtedly cause an immediate and unenviable comparison of Erdogan with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In view of these circumstances, it is almost impossible to imagine that Erdogan does not take into account the serious diplomatic, political and economic consequences of such actions. And yet, history shows that it is ready and capable of surviving these consequences.

In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, despite the losses that it caused her relations with the US and NATO. In the case of Syria, Erdogan performed his threats of the invasion after he has long signaled his intention to create a "security zone" in the north of the country. Turkish troops continue to threaten the expansion of their occupation, despite repeated warnings from Washington.

Instead of evading the confrontation, Erdogan presents these successes as an attempt to defeat the plot of NATO and the US aimed at destroying Turkey. If Erdogan believes that "our enemy is America, not Greece," as one of the observers has put it, it is possible that he considers the risk of breaking relations as a sad but necessary price that will have to be paid in the name of Turkey's national security.

Ryan Jingeras is a professor at the Department of National Security of Navy and expert on the history of Turkey, Balkans and the Middle East. Author of six books, including the book The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire, which is being prepared for publication (will be published by Penguin in October 2022).